Rural poverty in South Africa: Legacy of apartheid or consequence of contemporary segregationism?

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The paper deals with three core issues, namely a characterisation of rural poverty, a critique of the applicability of the notion of legacy to explain recent trends pertaining to rural poverty, and the construction of an argument that understands these trends in relation to post-1994 segregationism. Poverty in general has not declined since 1994, and that it is particularly severe in the former Bantustan areas of the country. The notion of legacy is not useful in explaining why rural poverty remains entrenched and unperturbed, long after 1994. Rural poverty in 2010 cannot be explained as something left behind from a concluded era of apartheid, because its causes and drivers are not dissimilar now in 2010, from what they were in 1970. The continuity spanning the pre- and post-1994 periods is best described through exploring and understanding post-1994 policy decisions and power configurations as an expression of contemporary segregationism.

Keywords: Rural poverty; legacy; Bantustan; segregationism

1. Introduction

On 31 May 2010, South Africa turned one hundred years old. In a normal course of events, this occasion would have been marked by considerable pomp and ceremony, patriotism and flag-waving. This was not the case. Of course, given South Africa’s history, one might have expected that the nation would have reflected on the day and its significance in a variety of ways: the white far-right taking to the streets on horseback, draped in vierkleurs; white liberals staying at home and quietly proposing a toast to Jan Smuts; the ruling ANC making measured statements aimed at reconciliation and inclusivity; the left rueing the incompleteness of the liberation struggle, and so on. But neither was this the case. The day passed without public acknowledgement, noteworthy only because it marked 11 days to go before kick-off. South Africa 2010 has nothing to do with the nature and history of this nation-state; and everything to do with the Fifa spectacle. Why is this the case? Very
crudely, it is so because common wisdom – the prevailing regime of truth – would have it that the New SA was a country that was born abruptly, without history, in 1994.

On the contrary, my basic assertion is that segregationism was a foundation stone of South Africa at the moment of its creation in 1910, and that it remains its foundation stone today, one hundred years later. Let me explain at the onset that I use the term segregation in its classical sense, to refer not to racism per se, but rather to the reservation of certain portions of the land holdings of a nation-state for particular racial groupings, and the governance of these reservations in specific ways. To re-state my basic assertion, I concur with the overall thesis of Mahmood Mamdani, who describes 1994 as having institutionalised de-racialisation, but not democratisation (Mamdani, 1996). That is to say, those portions of the country that were reserved for designated African groupings in terms of the 1913 Land Act, are still – after 1994 – governed distinctly and differently from the rest of South Africa. The people of Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown and East London – black and white – are governed by rights, democracy and development. The people of Keiskammahoek, Cofimvaba and Lusikisiki – all black – are governed by custom, tradition and welfare.

I make my case in 3 parts. First I present a snapshot of life in the Eastern Cape Province today. The snapshot presents a bleak picture, especially as it pertains to the former Bantustan areas of the Ciskei and Transkei. After presenting the snapshot, my next challenge is to explain the crisis. In order to do this, I return to the birth of the nation-state in 1910 and highlight the primacy of land reservation and segregationism in this process. Thirdly, and finally, I outline how segregationism has been inherited and deployed by the post-1994 government.

2. Eastern Cape Snapshot
Before 1994, the province was part of the larger Cape Province. The Eastern Cape contains two former Bantustans, namely the Transkei and Ciskei. These lie on its eastern half, whereas its western half fell within former white RSA. I now present a snapshot of the Eastern Cape province, by comparing and contrasting life on the eastern side of the province
(in the Bantustan areas) with the situation on the western side of the province (in the former Cape Provincial Administration areas). I start with income statistics.

- **General poverty:** average monthly household income in the Eastern Cape in terms of the latest available stats, gathered in 2005/6, is R1756.
- **West/east:** the further west a household, the better off it was (Nelson Mandela Metro – R2438), and the further east a household, the poorer it was (Alfred Nzo District – R1240).
- **Male/female:** male households earned significantly more (about R2100 on average) than the average household. Female headed households earned on average about R1400.
- **Rural/urban:** rural households earned far less income (R1276) than urban (R2357) households.
- The average person in rural Eastern Cape survived on R255 per month in 2005/6, which is well below the poverty line drawn by the Presidency a couple of years ago.
- **2005/6:** 73% of rural people in the province lived on less than R300 per month.
- **2007:** more than half of the rural population of the province lived on less than R220 per month.

In order to understand the dynamics and drivers of contemporary Bantustan poverty, it is instructive to understand income composition. By far the big component of household income is welfare transfers. The past ten years have seen a massive expansion of government’s welfare programme. This programme covers the rural population more extensively than the urban population. Whereas welfare contributes substantially to the income of the poor, wages do not. In 2006/7, only 16% of the rural population between the ages of 15 and 64 were employed. That is, 84% of this population were either unemployed or ‘not economically active’ (often a euphemism for permanently unemployed). It should be noted that the situation is undoubtedly more bleak now than in 2006/7, due to the crippling 2008/9 global recession. Last year, the South African economy shed over a million jobs, resulting in a decline in the employment rate from 45% to 41%. The recession in SA impacted mainly on the poor and marginalized (rather than the rich), so it is not

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1 This snapshot is derived from Border Rural Committee (BRC), 2009.
inconceivable that the employment rate in rural areas has now dropped below 15%. That is, for every 100 people between the ages of 15 and 64 yrs of age in the Bantustans, not even 15 earn income from a wage.

The other key point here is that unemployment in the former Bantustans is a very long-term condition. Typically, the life-trajectory of a Bantustan resident is that she goes to school at age six, leaves at the age of about nineteen with a poor Grade 10 certificate, goes into permanent unemployment thereafter, and dies in her fifties. For this reason, Seekings and Nattrass are correct to identify a distinct underclass in South Africa (Seekings et al, 2006: 271), and Adam correctly describes our typical Bantustan resident as a ‘permanently marginalized outsider’ (Adam, 1990: 47).

The average rural household does not have a single member who is employed, neither does it (any more) benefit from the remittance of wages earned in a city. In the early 1980s, remittance constituted a significant portion of average household income. But the development of the South African economy over the past two or so decades has not favoured semi- and un-skilled labourers. If there was some validity to refer to the Bantustan population as a ‘displaced proletariat’ in the 1970s, today this a nonsensical suggestion because only 5% of the population of the Ciskei and Transkei are currently active migrants. Of the diminished number of migrants, 60% do not remit money back home at all. There is a widening and deepening chasm between the urban and the rural in South Africa. Fewer people migrate from the rural to the urban than was the case ten years ago, and less money is remitted from the urban to the rural.

What then about the contribution of the apparent mainstay of the rural economy, agriculture, to household income? Is this perhaps the panacea, for rural families unable to make ends meet? The answer is a resounding ‘No’. Over the past sixty years, at least, there has been a consistent, sustained de-agrarianisation of the Bantustans. It is so serious that today only 1% of rural households derive an income from crop production and 4% from live stock production. In summary, there is pervasive chronic poverty in the Ciskei and Transkei today, characterised by low levels of economic activity (incl agriculture), a dearth of employment opportunities, and high levels of dependency on welfare. Unsurprisingly
therefore, rural households spend the majority of their income on food, and there is clear evidence of growing food insecurity in the Bantustans today, as measured through number of meals consumed, and quantity and variety of foods eaten.

Recent studies on poverty have pointed out that a narrow focus on income and financial assets obscures and denies other dimensions, indeed determinants, of deficiency and lack. In this regard, they point to the importance of considering issues such as education, health, levels of service and infrastructure, and so on. On all these fronts, the situation in the Ciskei and Transkei is as desperate as it is in relation to financial indicators. For example, about 33% of adults are functionally illiterate. This is hardly surprising, given that under one in five adults has successfully completed secondary school. The services that are the most important responsibilities of provinces are education and health, whereas municipal priorities include water and sanitation. One of the most stubborn myths about the so-called new SA is that it has successfully delivered water to the masses. The reality in the Ciskei and Transkei is as follows:

- two-thirds of rural households do not have access to RDP-standard water provision,
- and
- nearly half of the rural households use dam/river or spring water, and another 15% have to travel more than 200m to communal stand-pipes

The situation with regards to sanitation is possibly even more dire. 52% of households rely on unventilated basic pit latrines and 34% have no toilet facility at all. Crucially, recent surveys have found that levels of service delivery in most of the Ciskei and Transkei have declined over the past five years. In other words, fewer services are being delivered to the rural poor today, than was the case in 2005.

Clearly we do not currently live in an apartheid-era state of emergency; black South Africans are not burdened anymore by the constant threat of racially-defined forced removals; they no longer have to produce identity documentation or fear arrest or expulsion from the cities; they are no longer explicitly referred to as hewers of wood and carriers of water. Yet, black rural South Africans still – in 2010 – live in extreme poverty; those in the Ciskei and Transkei may now be regarded as South African citizens, with the right to vote, but there is
no place for them in the South African economy; they still depend on fire-wood for energy and the river for water. The reality is that, despite the massive expansion of the welfare system after 1994, poverty in the Bantustans today is probably worse now than it was at the dawn of liberal democracy. Consequently, with reference back to the dark days of 1980s apartheid, Crais has observed that in the Bantustans today, the ‘state of emergency in fact continues’ (Crais, 2002: 224).

If the state of emergency continues in Keiskammahoek, Cofimvaba and Lusikisiki, then so too does the state of accumulative normalcy in the leafy suburbs of Walmer, Oatlands, Beacon Bay, and so on. That is, as the poor in the Bantustans have got poorer since 1994, so the rich in the cities have got richer (Seekings & Nattrass, 2006: 3, 4). Put another way, national income inequalities worsened since 1994. In statistical terms, the Gini coefficient has worsened from 0.64 to 0.69. The reality is that South Africa, despite being a middle income country, remains the most unequal society in the world.

In this section of the paper, I have given a snapshot of life in the Eastern Cape Province. I have established the following:

- That most people living in the Ciskei and Transkei survive below the poverty line
- That household income in the areas is made up primarily of welfare transfers, whilst employment, remittances and agriculture contribute negligibly.
- That the provision of social infrastructure and services in these areas (that is, education and health) as well as water and sanitation has been woeful, and is in fact in decline.

Everatt and Smith have established that the prevailing situation in Ciskei and Transkei is replicated across Bantustan areas in other parts of South Africa (Everatt & Smith, 2008). It is quite apt to use terms developed by Baudrillard in the course of his elucidation of contemporary capitalism to describe the prevailing Bantustan situation – they are non-places, they are social voids, they are disaffected zones (Baudrillard, 1975).

The decline of the Bantustans has occurred during a period of sustained national economic expansion, characterised by a massive increase in the public purse, and tremendous accumulation and consolidation of wealth by powerful urban-based individuals. The Bantustan resident in 2010 is poor, unemployed, uneducated, sick, food and water insecure,
and has to relieve herself in unhygienic and undignified circumstances. The city dweller, by comparison, earns far more income, is more employable and more frequently employed, is better educated and has improved access to basic services. How are we to understand, or account for this dramatic, shocking contrast? Is this not a clear case of a legacy of the apartheid past? I don’t think so. The notion of legacy is useful in a situation where there has been a dramatic break from the past, where one trajectory stops and another begins. If the Bantustan resident was less poor now, if economic activity was on the rise, if education levels were improving, and so on, then we could talk usefully about legacies. So, I rule out the notion of legacy as a useful explanatory framework. For me to mount an alternative explanation I must return to the moment when our present was born, namely 1910.

3. The Birth of SA

South Africa is not only a recent nation-state, it is also a recent idea. The term was used with frequency only after South Africa achieved responsible government in the 1870s, and it had no constitutional meaning before Union. The South African War of 1899 – 1902 allowed a consolidation of white interests, which was a precondition for Union. In the works of Saul Dubow: ‘A war that was at once fought over possession of the country’s riches, by what were to become South Africans, in what was to become South Africa, has surely to be understood as a war for South Africa, not only in the immediate sense of acquisition and control, but also in the forward-looking sense of making a new nation-state – in effect a “white man’s country”’ (Dubow, 2006: 158). In the build-up to Union and during the first years of the new country, white South Africa remained divided. In this scenario, South Africanism was developed as the ideology that enabled whites to overcome their differences. South Africanism came to signify a broad form of patriotism to which both English- and Afrikaans-speakers could subscribe. This patriotism involved belief in scientific and technical progress rather than adherence to a civilizing set of morals and norms (Dubow, 2006: 165, 178). South Africanism was not only about the bringing together of Britons and Boers; it was a two-pronged population ploy, the second part of which was the separation/ segregation of blacks and whites (Dubow, 2006: 177).

From the turn of the century, science increasingly became the lens through which policy makers considered the key issue of the day, namely the native question. The native question related to two
inter-linked challenges faced by aspirant white power, namely how to secure an adequate supply of cheap labour to the mining industry and how to govern the majority black population (Ashforth, 1990: 23; Evans, 1997: 13). The answer to the question was forged in a concept of land reservation, first articulated at the 1903 Inter-Colonial Customs Conference in Bloemfontein, as follows: ‘the reservation by the State of land for the exclusive use and benefit of natives involves special obligations on their part to the State’ (Ashforth, 1990: 27). This principle underpinned deliberations in the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC), which was set up to address the issue definitively. The SANAC Report elaborated the reservation concept through developing an argument about the relationship between territory and citizenship.

The argument rested heavily on a particular understanding of customary tenure, namely that rights to indigenously-held land were vested not in the indigenous peoples (either individually or collectively), but rather in the person of the chief (Cousins, 2007: 297). With this foundation in place, the Commission developed its argument on the rights of ‘natives’ to reserved lands as follows:

- the ‘Natives’ have ‘distinct rights’ to the reserved lands because they were the ‘ancestral lands held by their forefathers’;
- occupation of this land was ‘traditionally’ under conditions of ‘communal tenure’, which amounted to a form of group ownership with the ‘Tribal Chief’ administering the lands in ‘trust’ for the people;
- through ‘peaceful annexation’, the ‘Chiefs’ transferred their sovereign rights to the Crown;
- these chiefly rights stemmed from the ownership of the land and were thus embodied in a ‘system’ known as tribalism;
- thus, the Crown, upon annexation, collected the full swag of rights and obligations previously possessed by the ‘Chief’ as sovereign. (Ashforth, 1990: 36, 37)

The SANAC report amounted to a sophisticated recommendation for the implementation of a system of segregation, founded on the practice of land reservation. By positing a particular relationship between territory and citizenship, the report fashioned what Ashforth calls the ‘structure of legitimacy’ that was characteristic of the twentieth century South African state (Ashforth, 1990: 35).
1910 is the year in which South Africa was forged, as a Union. Not coincidently, that was also the year in which the Department of Native Affairs was created. Three years later, Union’s parliament passed the Land Act, which formally ushered in segregation as the fundamental national policy. These developments – Union, Native Affairs, segregation – are best understood as constituting the birth of the South African nation, which I refer to ‘1910’. My contention here is that the 1910 nation is still largely intact today. The changes that took place in 1994 did not rock the firmaments of the 1910 nation-state.

During the twentieth century numerous governments used their legal authority to set up distinct juristic situations, operating in parallel. In certain cases, such as the establishment of concentration camps, this has involved the suspension of law. In other cases, such as the establishment of South Africa’s Bantustans, it has involved the construction of tailor-made juristic arrangements, which are distinct from those that pertain normally, in the nation. These different cases are both instances of what is referred to in the literature as invoking states of exception. Agamben uses the terms membership and inclusion to distinguish between those who live in exceptional and normal juridical terrains respectively. In his words, ‘[M]embership always exceeds inclusion’ (quoted in Baucom, 2005: 187); members, such as Bantustan residents, are not included within the normal juridical terrain. On the contrary, they are excluded from it, living as they do, in a state of exception. As such these people live what he calls ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998: 171), and what Patterson refers to as ‘social death’ (quoted in Baucom, 2005: 189).

The Reserve/Bantustan is identified by Baucom as one of ‘occidental modernity’s classical spaces of exception’ (Baucom, 2005: 188), whilst Cabral described it as ‘the largest concentration camp mankind has ever known’ (Cabral, 1973: 41). Quite clearly its inhabitants are an example of people who live outside normal legal parameters. For the Bantustan subject, social death or bare life is not temporary, it is the permanent norm.

4. Contemporary segregationism

Having outlined the state of emergency currently unfolding in the Bantustans – over fifteen years after the advent of liberal democracy – and having noted the centrality of establishing homelands as exceptional juridical terrains, in the moment of 1910, I now consider policy
developments after 1994. Specifically, I return to the question that I posed earlier, namely, to what extent did 1994 amount to a break with the past. Are the last fifteen years about undoing the legacy of colonialism and apartheid, or are they about re-imagining and re-enforcing practices of segregationism, in a modern guise? More specifically, has the ANC-government attacked segregationism or assimilated it as a technique of power? In my understanding, large portions of the segregation/ apartheid system of governance in rural areas have not only been left intact, rather they have actually been reinforced. Let me briefly provide three sets of evidence in this regard, relating to economic modalities, governance, and land reform.

Economic planning in the post-1994 period has been dominated by a spatial perspective. That is, decision-makers have used the map as the vital tool in making decisions about how, where and why economic investment should take place. Their assumption/ assertion is that some geographic areas to be more worthy of investment than others. In the South African situation, the consequences of selection and non-selection have been dramatic. Coega gets everything, the Ciskei gets nothing. As Helliker has pointed out, this type of discriminatory spatial perspective is compatible with or rather reflective of contemporary capitalism, which ‘thrives on uneven development and social marginalisation’ (Helliker, 2008: 80). All spheres of government have embraced this thinking in their respective programmes and interventions. For example, municipalities rely on spatial concepts such as nodes and zones to determine resource flows. In the Eastern Cape, the provincial government and many municipalities have adopted a three-level, triangulated model of public investment. The large, dull base of the triangle is referred to as ‘addressing basic needs’. At the apex of the triangle, government targets ‘focus areas’; this is about strategic investment, where returns are maximized (Amatole District Municipality, 2007: 72). The spatial coherence and logic of municipal and provincial plans are fine-tuned through the formulation of Spatial Development Frameworks. So, the Eastern Cape Province and its constituent municipalities have been demarcated anew, into strategic and unstrategic areas. Similarly, national government has become obsessed with a spatial perspective, driven aggressively by the Presidency.
This has resulted in huge investments being channeled to Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) and Industrial Development Zones (IDZs). Investment-type public resources are directed to these areas; whereas the large swathes of land falling outside are at the receiving end of only welfare-type resources. As the Chris Hani Municipality puts it in its IDP: ‘In localities with low development potential, government spending, beyond basic services, should focus on providing social transfers, human resource development and labour market intelligence to enable people to become more mobile and migrate, if they choose to, to localities that are more likely to provide sustainable employment or other economic opportunities’ (Chris Hani Municipality, 2008, 48).

The most important consequence of the hegemonic economic planning paradigm is that it has promoted the further development of (strategic) urban areas, and continued underdevelopment of (unstrategic) rural areas. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the elected government has not formulated or implemented a rural development strategy since 1994. It is incorrect to think about the absence of a substantial rural development strategy or programme as being a failure of government policy; it is better understood as a natural consequence of the primacy of the spatial development perspective. I should hasten to add here that the prominence accorded to rural development in the Polokwane resolutions, and subsequent ANC manifesto, have not resulted in a change in government priorities or programmes. To illustrate, the entire budget for rural development for 2010/11 is R256m. Quite clearly, the ANC can no longer continue to claim, as it did in the build-up to last year’s election, that rural development would be one of its top five priorities for the period 2009 – 2014. For the foreseeable future, rural development will remain elusive and chimerical.

Turning to governance, the decade after 1994 was characterized by a contestation between a progressive and a conservative bloc within the ANC. The former preached civil society and democratization; the latter clung onto so-called tradition and custom. Only in 2004 was it clear that the conservative forces had defeated the more progressive interests. The 2004 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) stipulates that traditional councils must be established in former Bantustan areas to operate alongside elected municipalities. Significantly, the TLGFA endorsed Tribal Authorities established through the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act ‘as a foundation’ for establishing Traditional Councils (Ntsebeza,
The majority of members of these councils are unelected, drawn from traditional authorities and those appointed by them. Beall, Mkhize and Vawda are correct in their assertion that the TLGFA ‘significantly entrenches the authority of traditional leaders, and means... that legislation introduced in the 21st century will give perpetual life to a system of ‘indirect rule’ dating back to the colonial era and ossified under apartheid’ (Beall et al, 2005: 763). Or, as Crais has put it, the ANC government has renewed ‘a tradition of rule’ that began with conquest and continued in the twentieth century during the eras of segregation and apartheid (Crais, 2002: 227). The Eastern Cape government has embraced the conservative turn through restoring a number of chieftaincies and re-instating the institution of headmanship. It recently increased the salaries of iinkosana (i.e. headmen) from R2705 to R6700 per month. At a time that normal salary increases range from about 7 to 9%, headmen’s salaries have risen by well over 100%.

The contents of a Traditional Courts Bill tabled for consideration in Parliament in May 2008 is further evidence of the extent to which traditional authorities have emerged as powerful over the recent period. The Bill has been formulated to address some of the issues previously regulated by the now repealed infamous Black Administration Act of 1927, especially the exercise of customary justice in the former Bantustans. The continuities are stark with regard to the composition of traditional courts, their geographic jurisdiction, and their juridical powers. With regard to the latter issue, the Bill accords traditional courts the powers to extract forced labour from offenders and to strip them of customary rights to land and water. Further, it gives the rulings of traditional courts the same authority as those of magistrate’s courts (Joubert, 2008: 3). If the bill is passed, it will fuse executive and judicial power into the hands of unelected traditional leaders. It is exactly this fusion of power that characterised customary colonial power, as described by Mamdani. ‘The administrative justice and the administrative coercion that were the sum and substance of [the chief’s] authority lay behind a regime of extra-economic coercion, a regime that breathed life into a whole range of compulsions: forced labour, forced crops, forced sales, forced contributions, and forced removals’ (Mamdani, 1996: 23).

Just as the institution of traditional leadership has waxed over the past five years, in rural areas the fragile institution of municipalities has waned over this period. The 2009
Municipal IQ survey points to the widening disparities between municipalities in former white South Africa and those in the former Bantustans. According to the survey, the weakest District Municipality in the country is the largest in the former Transkei, namely OR Tambo. 12 of the local municipalities falling within this area vanquish in the list of the worst 15% of municipalities in the country, with Mbashe coming stone last. As Oomen puts it, ours is a ‘patchwork democracy’ (quoted in Claassens, 2008: 274).

There are three programmes or legs of land reform in post-1994 South Africa, namely redistribution, restitution and tenure reform. Redistribution seeks to effect balance in land ownership between black and white; in the medium-term it attempts to change the infamous 87:13 ratio to something closer to 60:40. The mechanism through which this is achieved is a state grant, which was recently substantially increased, from a range of R20 000 to R100 0000 per beneficiary, to one of R100 000 to R400 000. Since the adoption of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) Policy in 2000, as the primary mechanism to achieve redistribution, the Bantustans have effectively been excluded from redistribution. Of the 349 LRAD projects in the province in 2007, only 3 were located in the former Transkei. Restitution seeks to effect some measure of justice for black people who were dispossessed of land rights through racially-discriminatory law or practice after 1913. Since 1994, most of the land reform budget has been spent on restitution. In 1996, government declared that it regarded the most significant type of forced removals to have been implemented after 1913, namely betterment dispossession, to fall outside the scope of the restitution process. Significantly, virtually all betterment schemes were implemented in the Bantustans. By stipulating that betterment was out of restitution, government effectively excluded people living in the Bantustans from restitution.

Tenure reform aims to secure the land rights of the those whose claim to land that they hold or occupy is weak as a result of racial prejudice. It has been the least resourced, most incoherent of the three programmes. A notable moment in the brief, inglorious saga of tenure reform was the passing into law of the Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA) in 2004. This law is archetypal post-1994 segregationism. The property system in former white South Africa is left untouched, whilst tenure in the Bantustans is codified as second-class, inferior, insecure. The Act strengthened the property power of the Minister and traditional
authorities, and weakens the standing of individual rights-claimers, especially certain categories of women (e.g. divorcees, unmarried adult sisters). Thankfully, a few months ago the Constitutional Court recently declared CLARA unconstitutional. However, this does not change the key point here, namely that the relatively well-resourced programmes of restitution and redistribution apply in former white South Africa, whereas the second-class tenure reform programme applies in the former Bantustans.

One more point. Given the centrality of customary tenure the practise of South African exceptionalism, that is segregationism, it is likely that there will be no progress in formulating, let alone implementing, any coherent, progressive tenure reform programme in the foreseeable future. It is simply inconceivable that this government, which now has such a settled, effective strategy of rural governance – revolving around welfare, chiefs and headmen, and apartheid-era custom – would tamper with its basis, namely a land tenure system that fosters dependency.

5. Conclusion
Haitian historian Trouillot has written that the ‘so-called legacies of past horrors... are possible only because of [the renewal of practices of domination]. And that renewal occurs only in the present’ (Trouillot, 1995, 151). Quite clearly, the entrenched and worsening so-called legacy of apartheid and segregationism – that of deepening divisions between the Bantustans and former RSA areas – are possible only because of the renewal of practises of segregationism after 1994. 1994 did not signal a moment of discontinuity, it did not mark the end of one era and the beginning of another. Our today is our yesterday, and our tomorrow will still be our yesterday. We live in the segregationist past. 1994 features in my narrative of South African history as a tragic twist in the tale – a chimera of freedom, that has materialised as condemnation to the camp.

For the Bantustan subject, 1994 meant that she was no longer regarded as an ‘extradomestic alien’ – as a foreigner in the land of her birth – but she has not yet attained citizenship. Instead, she has now morphed into a kind of domestic tenant, or serf, entirely dependent for survival and shelter on the goodwill and largesse of the welfare state and its various custodians of tradition and custom. In
other words, 1994 meant that the Bantustan subject has changed, in the words of Baucom, from one form of ‘haunting opposite of the citizen’ to another. (Baucom, 2005, 190)

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